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Abstract 
 
    There is a major debate regarding the role of concentrated family ownership and 
control in large firms, with three positions suggesting that such concentration is (1) good, (2) 
bad, or (3) irrelevant for firm performance. This article reports two studies to shed further light 
on this debate. Study 1 uses 744 publicly listed large firms in eight Asian countries to test 
competing hypotheses on the impact of the combination of family ownership and control on 
firm performance. On a country-by-country basis, our findings support all three positions. On 
an aggregate, pooled sample basis, the results support the “irrelevant” position. Study 2, based 
on a sample of 688 firms from the same eight Asian countries, endeavors to answer why Study 
1 obtains different results for different countries. We theorize and document that Study 1 
findings may be systematically associated with the level of shareholder protection embodied in 
legal and regulatory institutions. Study 2 thus sketches the contours of a cross-country, 
institution-based theory of corporate governance. Overall, our two studies lead to a 
finer-grained and more cumulative understanding of the crucial debate on family ownership and 
c o n t r o l   i n   l a r g e   f i r m s .         
    
JEL Codes:    M1 
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Family ownership and control refer to one family (through one or several members) 
serving as a dominant (controlling) shareholder of a corporation. Are family ownership and 
control of large firms beneficial for or detrimental to firm performance? Under what conditions 
do the benefits of family ownership and control of large firms outweigh their costs? Despite the 
ubiquity of concentrated family ownership and control in large firms around the world, 
interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, there is no clear answer to these questions. This article, 
therefore, takes on these important but underexplored questions. Most small firms around the 
world are owned and managed by families. Theoretically, such a concentration of ownership 
and control seems to be an uncontroversially optimal arrangement with reasons ranging from 
more hands-on and less bureaucratic management to reduced principal-agent conflicts (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). What is relatively unclear and thus controversial is the impact of 
concentrated family ownership and control on the performance of large firms.   
One key reason that there is no clear answer is because of the relative paucity of 
research on large firms with concentrated family ownership and control (Morck, 2000). 
Dominated by agency theory, corporate governance research has focused on the separation of 
ownership and control. More than 70 years ago, Berle and Means (1932) advanced a hypothesis 
suggesting that as firms grow larger, concentrated family ownership and control will inevitably 
be replaced by a separation of ownership and control. Fama and Jensen (1983: 306) predict that 
failure to separate ownership and control “tends to penalize the organization in the competition 
for survival.” In other words, concentration of ownership and control in the hands of families 
may be bad for the performance of large firms.                 
However, on a worldwide basis, the separation of ownership and control hypothesized 
by Berle and Means (1932) and articulated by Fama and Jensen (1983) “is actually an exception 
rather than the rule around the world,” and “most corporations around the world [outside the 
United States and the United Kingdom] are controlled by a family or the state, characterized by 
concentrated ownership” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999: 498).
1 Thus,  there  is 
                                                        
1  For example, in Canada, a country very close to the United States and United Kingdom culturally and 
geographically, more than 380 of the 400 largest publicly traded corporations have concentrated   3
a significant mismatch between the Berle and Means (1932) hypothesis on the inevitability of 
the separation of ownership and control for large firms and evidence from most areas of the 
world.
2 
While it is possible to follow the Fama and Jensen (1983) logic by arguing that these 
“stubborn” large firms which refuse to separate ownership and control are inefficient, this 
argument cannot go very far when confronting the evidence that the vast majority of large firms 
outside the United States and United Kingdom, including those in some of the most prosperous, 
developed economies such as continental Europe and Japan, have concentrated family 
ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 774). Therefore, it seems more sensible to 
acknowledge the limits of the Berle and Means (1932) hypothesis by conceding that 
concentrated family ownership and control in large firms may be good for firm performance, at 
least  in  some  cases.           
Thus far, most corporate governance research has focused on stylized U.S. (and to a less 
extent U.K.) firms which separate ownership and control. Consequently, there is value in 
investigating firms outside the Anglo-American world when advancing research on large firms 
which still combine ownership and control (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). Specifically, this 
article reports two studies which focus on a region with extensive concentration of family 
ownership and control in large firms – Asia (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Wan, 2003; Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang, 2000). Study 1 tests basic competing hypotheses on whether family 
ownership and control in large firms are good, bad, or irrelevant for firm performance. Study 2 
theorizes and documents that the findings in Study 1 may be associated with the level of 
shareholder protection embodied in legal and  regulatory  institutions.      
Overall, this article departs from the existing literature in four significant ways. First, 
theoretically, we focus on the concentration of ownership and control in large family firms, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
ownership and control in the hands of a single family (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998: 536). 
2  La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that families and the state are the two major owner groups of 
corporations around the world. In this article, we choose to focus on family ownership and control. 
There is a separate literature on state ownership and its spin-off, privatization, which is outside the scope 
of the present article.         4
which have a family and/or its identifiable members as the largest owner(s). This contrasts 
sharply with most existing research based on the separation of ownership and control in 
professionally managed firms. Second, we draw on multiple theories such as resource-based 
and institutional theories, whereas most corporate governance research often relies solely on 
agency theory. Third, especially through Study 2, we endeavor to sketch the contours of a 
cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate governance. Finally, we empirically take 
advantage of a large database covering eight Asian countries. While existing studies either 
focus on a single country or lump data from multiple countries for an “Asian” model, we make 
and substantiate the case (1) that within Asia, family ownership and control in large firms are 
good (that is, benefits outweighing costs) in some countries, bad in some other countries, and 
irrelevant in the remaining countries, and (2) that such differences are systematically correlated 
with different legal and regulatory frameworks governing  shareholder  protection.        
 
THE DEBATE 
Empirically, there is no dispute that in Asia, (continental) Europe, and Latin America, 
the vast majority of large, publicly traded firms are family owned and controlled (Carney and 
Gedajlovic, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; de Miguel, Pindado, and de la Torre, 2004; Faccio, 
Lang, and Young, 2001; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2000).
3  Theoretically, there is a major debate regarding the role of family in 
large firms, with three positions: such concentrated ownership and control are (1) good, (2) bad, 
or (3) irrelevant for firm performance. To be sure, given the complexity, the debate is not about 
family ownership and control of large firms being absolutely good or bad. “Good” and “bad” 
are just short hand descriptions of the benefits outweighing or not outweighing the costs 
associated with family ownership and control.   
Among the three positions, first, some agency theorists (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and some family business scholars (Habbershon and Williams, 1999) 
extend their endorsement for the efficiency gains of family owned small firms to the context of 
                                                        
3  Even in the United States, “shareholdings are not so diffusely owned as is often supposed” (Demsetz, 
1983: 390). In the 1990s, families were present in one-third of the Standard and Poor’s 500 firms and 
accounted for 18% of equity (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).   5
large firms. Second, other agency theorists (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and other family business 
researchers (Schulze et al. 2001) argue that large firms which refuse to separate ownership from 
control would be less efficient than firms with dispersed ownership. In addition, a third group of 
scholars find no performance difference between founder managed and professionally managed 
firms (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Willard, Krueger, and Feeser, 1992), implying that family 
ownership and control are irrelevant for firm performance. Most existing theories on the 
determinants of firm performance (e.g., the five forces model) are silent on the ownership and 
control issue, implicitly endorsing the “irrelevant” perspective.   
Each side of this debate has a set of valid theoretical logic and empirical evidence in 
support of its view (de Vries, 1993; Villalonga and Amit, 2005). Our two studies are designed 
to shed further light on the debate, not by supporting one particular view but by acknowledging 
the validity of all sides (Study 1) and then endeavoring to address the more interesting question 
of “why?” (Study 2). 
 
STUDY 1: COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
Study 1 directly tests competing hypotheses by focusing on two of the three primary 
ownership and control mechanisms: (1) appointing a family member as the CEO and (2) 
pyramiding.
4  While the practice of CEO appointment is straightforward, pyramiding requires 
some elaboration here. A pyramid occurs when a family controls other firms through a chain of 
ownership. In other words, a family owns and controls a firm through another firm. Through 
such pyramiding, it is common for a firm’s ultimate shareholders to have formal control rights 
that are greater than ownership (cash-flow) rights.
5  Pyramid structures are the predominant 
mode of corporate organization outside the United States (Morck, 2005). This arrangement 
potentially increases the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders, because the 
financial benefits from expropriation may disproportionately outweigh the financial costs for 
                                                        
4  Another primary mechanism for family ownership and control is shares with superior voting rights – 
often used in Latin America (Lins, 2003). However, because Asian firms tend not to use this mechanism 
(La Porta et al., 1999), we do not consider it here. 
5  For example, a family owns 50% of the shares of Company X, which owns 40% of Company B, 
which in turn owns 30% of Company C. The family ends up with 6% (50% x 40% x 30%) of the 
ownership (cash-flow) rights of C but 30% of its control rights (Faccio et al., 2001: 56).   6
the family (Chang, 2003). 
Family CEO: The Good 
Certain streams of two perspectives, agency theory and resource-based view, suggest 
that appointing a family member as the CEO may be beneficial. One stream of agency theory 
argues that there are significant advantages in appointing family members as CEOs (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003).
6  This is because “family members have many dimensions of exchange with 
one another over a long horizon that lead to advantages in monitoring and disciplining” the 
family CEO (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 306). Because such interest alignment – and family ties – 
between principals (family owners) and agents (family CEOs) reduces agency costs (Westphal, 
1999), firms with family CEOs (as opposed to nonfamily, professional CEOs, who may even be 
professionally more qualified) may perform better than firms with nonfamily CEOs (Durand 
and Vargas, 2003; Lee, Lim, and Lim, 2003).   
Similarly, the resource-based view, when applied in the context of family firms, yields a 
converging prediction (Barney, 2001). Although primarily working in the context of small firms, 
family business researchers have long argued that “familiness” embedded in a kin network such 
as common interest and identity, goal congruence, trust, and reciprocity provides valuable, 
unique, and hard-to-imitate sources of competitive advantage (Durand and Vargas, 2003; 
Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Ireland and Miller, 2004). Compared 
with professional managers, family CEOs may have competitive advantages in gaining access 
to unique resources. In emerging economies with weak market-supporting institutional 
frameworks, access to resources is often not through formal channels (such as banks) but often 
through informal, private networks (such as business groups) (Peng, 2003). A business group is 
“a set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of 
formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001: 47). Business groups are ubiquitous in emerging economies and often controlled by 
well-connected families (Morck, 2005). With wide-ranging family connections, a family CEO 
                                                        
6  Another stream of agency theory argues for exactly the opposite (see the next section)   7
may have more advantage in accessing resources which otherwise would not be available to the 
firm.  Thus:    
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a family CEO is positively related with firm performance. 
Family CEO: The Bad   
Other streams of agency theory and resource-based view make the case that having a 
family CEO may be detrimental. Agency theorists argue that despite some benefits such as 
reduced agency conflicts, family CEOs, as inside shareholders, may have incentives to adopt 
investment policies that benefit themselves and their families, but reduce the payout to outside 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Even qualified and 
competent family CEOs, if they are not strictly disciplined, may deviate from shareholder 
wealth maximization (Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and 
Makri,  2003).    
Another branch of resource-based view argues that the appropriate resources – such as 
family ties – are necessary but insufficient to achieve a competitive advantage, and that 
“familiness” must be managed effectively (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Specifically, altruism 
commonly found in family firms – the selfless regard for the well-being of other family 
members – may hurt firm performance (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003). Deeply altruistic, 
family members subscribe to a curious mix of rationalities, juxtaposing contradictory economic 
and altruistic (noneconomic) motivations to justify their behavior. As a result, family relations 
may make agency conflicts “more difficult” to resolve (Schulze et al., 2001: 102, original 
italics), because relations between principals (family owners) and agents (family CEOs) are 
likely based on emotions, sentiments, and informal linkages, which may result in less effective 
monitoring and disciplining of family managers.   
Sons, daughters, in-laws, and other relatives, who may be incompetent, may be 
appointed as family CEOs. Once on the job, they may destroy value. Thus, altruism, especially 
parents’ failure to discipline underperforming adult children serving as family managers, creates 
agency problems. In the imperfect managerial labor market whereby their positions are not   8
threatened, family CEOs do not have to maximize efforts to keep their jobs. Overall, the higher 
the level of parents’ altruism, the higher the risk that parents may spoil adult children serving as 
family managers (de Vries, 1993). 
In addition, family CEOs themselves often have a hard time dealing with other family 
members. Altruism can create a sense of entitlement among family members for employment, 
perquisites, and privileges that these individuals otherwise would not receive (Schulze et al., 
2003). Altruism may also make family CEOs loath to adopt and enforce formal rules and 
procedures.  
Finally, family squabbles – the opposite of altruism – may add other complications to 
make family CEOs ineffective. Family management can incur other costs, such as sibling 
rivalry, generational envy, non-merit-based compensation, and irrational strategic decisions 
(Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez, 2001). Family CEOs may enter into power 
competition with other family members, and have incentives to enhance CEOs’ own power and 
prestige rather than to create profits. In addition, after the founding generation passes away (a 
very likely scenario given the large size of the firm now), the firm becomes a sibling 
partnership, in which each sibling partner is likely to be more concerned about his/her own 
welfare and that of his/her immediate family rather than other siblings’ welfare (Stark and Falk, 
1998). The family CEO in a sibling partnership usually lacks the authority and influence over 
other siblings because typically the principal is neither the founder of the firm nor the biological 
head of the family (Schulze et al., 2003). In comparison, outside CEOs may be more focused on 
work and less likely to get into family squabbles. In summary:   
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a family CEO is negatively related with firm performance. 
Pyramid Structure: The Good 
Resource-based theory suggests that a pyramid structure may be beneficial for firm 
performance. With a pyramid structure, a family controls multiple firms, each becoming a 
member of an informal business group. Other members of such a group in the pyramid may 
provide useful information, access to finances and technologies, and important social   9
interactions (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). If the focal firm suffers from performance problems, 
other member firms may come to rescue it by injecting resources such as assets and talents 
(Chang and Hong, 2000; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002).   
Relative to independent firms without such pyramid/group affiliations, these affiliations 
and connections for pyramid firms may add value. Proponents of resource-based view address 
controlling shareholder’s contribution as boundary spanners of the organization and its 
environment (Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000). Specifically, pyramid firms – those with 
links to their affiliates through a pyramid – can gain access to other pyramid firms’ resources 
(Hoskisson et al., 2003). Thus, according to the resource-based view (Barney, 2001), abilities to 
do so may become valuable, unique, and hard-to-imitate resources (Guillen, 2000). How 
pyramid firms derive benefits from their affiliations and connections is not through costly 
formal contracting, but through relational contracting, social networks, and family ties. This 
may be especially the case in Asia (Bruton et al., 2003; Chen, 2001). As suggested by the 
literature on relational contracting and social networks in emerging economies (Peng, 2003, 
2004), nonpyramid firms outside these networks may have a hard time accessing these highly 
idiosyncratic and informal relationship- and family-based assets. Thus:   
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a pyramid structure is positively related with firm 
performance. 
Pyramid Structure: The Bad 
The primary theory critical of the pyramid structure is agency theory. Some of the 
intragroup activities described above may be labeled as “expropriation” of minority 
shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the tendency of controlling shareholders 
such as families pursuing their private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
increases when the controlling shareholders own less equity in a pyramid structure. Through 
pyramiding, one family can control multiple publicly listed firms each with many minority 
shareholders. When several firms rescue one firm within the pyramid through asset injection, 
the interests of minority shareholders of the firms which transfer resources may resent these   10
activities which reduce the value of their shares (Dyck and Zingales, 2004).         
In emerging economies where markets for corporate control usually do not operate 
effectively because of a lack of formal market-supporting institutions, expropriation of minority 
shareholders can take the form of (1) tunneling (digging a tunnel to sneak out corporate 
resources – such theft is often illegal) (Bertrand et al., 2002), and (2) related transactions 
(selling firm assets to another company owned by controlling shareholders at below-market 
places – this is often legal) (Chang, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000). Because prospective minority 
shareholders realize that controlling families’ interests diverge from theirs, they in response 
may discount such shares or refuse to invest, leading to a higher cost of capital and a lower 
level of performance for pyramid firms (Lins, 2003). Therefore:   
Hypothesis 4: The presence of a pyramid structure is negatively related with firm 
performance.  
Overall, it seems difficult to tell a priori whether the benefits of concentrated family 
ownership and control in large firms outweigh the costs, or vice versa (de Vries, 1993; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2005). This debate thus calls for empirical efforts. 
 
STUDY 1: METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Variables   
For Study 1, we amass a database covering 744 large, publicly listed, family-owned and 
-controlled corporations in eight countries in East and Southeast Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
7 Our  data  collection 
efforts are guided by three considerations. First, in the literature, most studies focus on only one 
country. A smaller number of studies pool data from a number of Asian countries to generate 
models of “Asian corporate governance” (Lemmon and Lins, 2003), which assume substantial 
                                                        
7  Among major Asian economies, only China and Japan are omitted. China is not included because most 
listed firms there are state-owned and family ownership and control of large listed corporations are very 
rare (Peng, 2004: 460). Japan is excluded because as the only developed economy in the region, Japan 
has the highest percentage of professional managers heading its large corporations (Claessens et al., 
2000: 92).   11
homogeneity among these countries. However, “significant cross-country differences exist” 
(Claessens et al., 2000: 82). We attempt to overcome this limitation by performing analysis both 
on a country-by-country basis and a pooled basis. Second, we look for a region whereby 
concentrated family ownership and control are especially profound. Firms in Asia are very 
appropriate for this purpose (Chen, 2001; Phan, 2001). Finally, we are intrigued by the recent 
changes in Asia. Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, family ownership and control were widely 
regarded as embodiment of “family values” which contributed to the Asian economic growth 
(also known as the “miracle”). However, since the 1997 crisis, this pattern of ownership and 
control, often in the hands of the same families owning and controlling the same assets, has 
often been harshly criticized as evidence of “crony capitalism” (Backman and Butler, 2003) – 
the “good” somehow becomes the “bad.” From a policy standpoint, post-1997 corporate 
governance reforms aiming at “taming” the leading families,
8  in the absence of concrete 
empirical evidence, also necessitate our attention. To avoid the potential complications 
associated with the various post-1997 reforms, we follow Joh (2003) by focusing on the 
relatively calm year of 1996. This also avoids complications associated with the region-wide 
collapse of the share prices of virtually all listed firms during  the  1997  crisis.             
Our primary sources are (1) Asian Corporate Governance Archival Data Center (which 
primarily draws on Worldscope and World Bank data sources)
9  and (2) Datastream. Since all 
stock exchanges require firms to be sufficiently large in order to qualify for public listing, a 
firm whose shares are publicly listed and traded is regarded as a “large firm.” A “family-owned 
and -controlled large firm” is defined as having a family and/or its identifiable members as the 
largest owner(s). Family ownership of each company is traced to its ultimate owner and is 
identified by how much control rights share, in percentage of total outstanding shares, the 
family owner has (Claessens et al., 2000). A 5% family control rights cutoff is used to assure 
that the largest shareholder has sufficiently concentrated ownership and control. Given our 
                                                        
8  In South Korea, a number of leading members of prominent business families have been jailed since 
1997. 
9  Previous studies using this data source have appeared in reputable journals such as the American 
Economic Review (Faccio et al., 2001) and Journal of Financial Economics (Claessens et al., 2000).   12
focus, we exclude firms whose largest owner is the state, a financial institution, or a widely held 
corporation. In other words, only firms with a family (one individual or several members) as the 
largest identifiable shareholder are included.   
The independent variables are (1) family ownership, (2) family CEO, and (3) pyramid 
structure. Family ownership is measured by cash-flow rights in percentage of total outstanding 
shares. We use a dummy variable equal to one for firms having a family CEO and zero 
otherwise. Following Hoskisson et al. (2003), we measure pyramid with a dummy variable. 
The dependent variable, firm performance, is measured by the cumulative stock return 
in 1996 (between January 1 and December 31) reported by Datastream. A stock market-based 
performance measure is used as the performance indicator for three reasons. First, unlike 
performance measures based on accounting data, market-based performance measures are not 
influenced by firm-specific reporting idiosyncrasies and potential managerial manipulation. 
Second, using stock market data eliminates the problem with accounting data which are 
distorted by different accounting and tax systems across countries. Third, the use of a 
market-based measure is consistent with an important principle in agency theory – that is, 
managers should maximize the market value of the firm.   
Three commonly used control variables are used. The first is firm size, measured by the 
logarithm of market capitalization, which is transformed to U.S. dollars using the official 
exchange rate on December 31, 1996. Second, we control firm age. Third, we also include 
dummy variables for 12 broad industries to control for industry effects. 
Econometric Issues 
We estimate the following model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method: 
Stock return = α + β1 (family ownership) + β2 (family CEO) + β3 (pyramid structure) + β4 
(logarithm of market capitalization) + β5 (age) + ε (including industry dummies). Data are fit 
into the model country by country, thus resulting in eight models. When the pooled data are fit 
into the ninth model, we include dummy variables for the countries to control for country 
effects.   13
In terms of econometric issues, multicollinearity does not appear to be a significant 
problem, because the average variance inflation factor for each country is less than 10. 
Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust (Huber-White-Sandwich) standard errors. We have 
also tested for omitted variables using the Ramsey test of the powers of the independent 
variables. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that our model has no omitted variables at the 
95% confidence level, indicating that there are no significant variables which are omitted.   
Another issue is the potential endogeneity of the regressors. If the governance variables 
are not exogenous, then their estimated coefficients may be inconsistent or unclear. Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) show that ownership and firm value can be jointly determined. However, La 
Porta et al. (1999) report that ownership structures for large Asian firms are relatively stable 
over time. It seems unlikely that firms can change their ownership structures quickly and 
frequently in light of temporary over- or under-valuations. Thus, the possibility of endogeneity 
is less likely to be significant. 
 
STUDY 1: FINDINGS 
Table 1 provides the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. In Table 2, regarding 
family CEO, Hypothesis 1 (the “good” hypothesis) is supported in Indonesia and Taiwan, and 
Hypothesis 2 (the “bad” hypothesis) is supported in Hong Kong. The presence of a family CEO 
has no significant impact in other countries, thereby supporting the default, “irrelevant” 
perspective. Specifically, holding other things constant, the stock return is 48% higher for firms 
with a family CEO than those with a nonfamily CEO in Indonesia and 34% higher in Taiwan. 
On the other hand, the stock return of Hong Kong firms with a family CEO performs 28% 
lower than firms with a nonfamily CEO.  14
Table 1.   
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Hong Kong (N = 151) 
Variables  Mean  S.D.    1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Stock  return  0.54  0.71       
2.  Family  ownership  25.76  11.4  -0.03      
3.  Family  CEO  0.68 0.47 -0.15  0.12      
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.33 0.47 0.10 -0.46  0.22    
5. Market capitalization (log)  16.85  1.48  0.06  -0.15  -0.32  0.03   
6.  Firm  age  28.46 21.01 -0.13 0.10  -0.09 -0.06 0.24 
 
Indonesia (N = 95) 
1. Stock return  0.36  0.9           
2.  Family  ownership  24.62 11.25 -0.09        
3.  Family  CEO  0.91 0.29 0.10 0.12      
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.74 0.44 0.02 -0.36  0.30    
5. Market capitalization (log)  9.53  1.29  0.16  -0.09  -0.1  0.04   
6.  Firm  age  22.06 13.71 0.14  -0.00 0.14  0.17  0.01 
 
Malaysia (N = 121) 
1.  Stock  return  0.41  0.48       
2.  Family  ownership  25.6  11.06  0.02      
3.  Family  CEO  0.94 0.23 0.07 -0.06       
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.43 0.5  0.14 -0.49 0.00    
5. Market capitalization (log)  13  0.86  -0.16  -0.23  0.06  -0.03   
6.  Firm  age  29.7 18.57  -0.12 0.24 0.03 -0.02 0.15 
 
Philippines (N = 47) 
1.  Stock  return  0.16  0.5       
2.  Family  ownership  22.4  12.29  0.14      
3.  Family  CEO  0.68 0.47 0.20 0.17      
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.55  0.5  -0.02 -0.05 -0.25    
5.  Market  capitalization  (log)  12.65  1.27 0.28 0.07 0.27 -0.08   
6.  Firm  age  32.47 23.11 0.12  -0.46 -0.13 0.14  -0.08 
 
Singapore (N = 71) 
1.  Stock  return  -0.05  0.24       
2.  Family  ownership  22.73 11.87 -0.09        
3.  Family  CEO  0.89 0.32 -0.14  0.30      
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.69 0.47 0.23 -0.42  -0.24       15
5. Market capitalization (log)  16.76  1.01  0.24  -0.50  -0.33  0.17   
6.  Firm  age  25.83  17.05  0.10 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.04   16
South Korea (N = 131) 
1.  Stock  return  -0.11  0.61       
2.  Family  ownership  19.82  9.3  0.19      
3.  Family  CEO  0.76 0.43 0.03 0.08      
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.34 0.47 -0.17  -0.22  0.14    
5. Market capitalization (log)  4.99  0.99  -0.22  -0.36  -0.04  0.08   
6.  Firm  age  32.91 13.07 -0.06 0.10  -0.16 0.05  0.04 
 
Taiwan (N = 60) 
1.  Stock  return  0.29  0.28       
2.  Family  ownership  18.68  9.75  -0.10      
3.  Family  CEO  0.97 0.18 0.11 -0.01       
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.68  0.47 -0.04 -0.14 0.27     
5. Market capitalization (log)  19.65  0.15  0.29  -0.37  -0.00  -0.02   
6.  Firm  age  27.08 9.91 -0.09 0.27  -0.14 0.21  0.02 
 
Thailand (N = 64) 
1.  Stock  return  -0.28  0.37       
2.  Family  ownership  34.58  14.4  -0.21      
3.  Family  CEO  0.75 0.44 -0.03  -0.03       
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.16 0.37 0.14 -0.26  0.05    
5. Market capitalization (log)  14.2  1.27  -0.14  -0.05  0.04  -0.20   
6.  Firm  age  21.97 17.32 -0.20 -0.04 -0.03 -0.24 0.06 
 
Whole sample (N = 744) 
1.  Stock  return  0.21  0.65       
2.  Family  ownership  24.23  11.91  -0.01      
3.  Family  CEO  0.81 0.39 -0.00  0.06      
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.46 0.5  0.06 -0.35  0.14    
5.  Market  capitalization  (log)  12.9 4.71 0.18 0.05 -0.01  0.05  
6.  Firm  age  27.97 17.55 -0.04 0.00  -0.06 -0.01 -0.05   17
Table 2 
Study 1: Direct Effects of Family Ownership and Control Mechanisms on Firm Performance a 
 
 
Hong 
Kong   Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore 
South 
Korea   Taiwan   Thailand 
Whole 
sample 
Family ownership  0.007  -0.002  0.006  0.014  0.002  0.006  0.000  -0.006  0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.004) (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Family CEO  -0.278* 0.484**  0.151 0.128  -0.05  0.05  0.335**  -0.058 -0.011 
  (0.156)  (0.227)  (0.134) (0.151)  (0.123)  (0.096) (0.135)  (0.090) (0.056) 
Pyramid  0.313* -0.368**  0.173*  -0.075  0.119* -0.174**  -0.086 -0.02 0.028 
  (0.174)  (0.177)  (0.098) (0.136)  (0.064)  (0.086) (0.107)  (0.152) (0.046) 
Market  cap  (log) -0.01 0.110*  -0.038 0.06  0.064*  -0.134*  0.558  -0.031 0.008 
  (0.044)  (0.065)  (0.046) (0.048)  (0.034)  (0.072) (0.275)  (0.035) (0.020) 
Age -0.005  0.01  -0.003  0.01  0.001  -0.002 -0.002  -0.005**  -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.002) (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant  0.965  -0.836  0.583 -1.117  -1.149 0.44  -11.051**  0.547 0.178 
 (0.898)  (0.896)  (0.645)  (0.687) (0.672)  (0.294)  (5.495)  (0.610)  (0.295) 
N 151  95  125  47  71  131  60  64  744 
R
2  0.1366  0.264  0.1792 0.3343  0.2009  0.1262 0.2977  0.2706 0.1992 
 
 
a. Numbers in parentheses are White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. Industry dummies are 
included in the models, and country dummies are included in the full sample model but are not reported due to space 
constraints.  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
Also shown in Table 2, regarding the pyramid structure, Hypothesis 3 (the “good” 
hypothesis) is supported in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Hypothesis 4 (the “bad” 
hypothesis) is supported in Indonesia and South Korea. Specifically, in Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
and Singapore, the stock return of firms with a pyramid structure outperform their counterparts 
without such a structure by 31%, 17%, and 12%, respectively. Conversely, in Indonesia and 
South Korea, the stock return of pyramid firms is 37% and 17% lower, respectively, than that of 
nonpyramid firms. On the other hand, the pyramid structure seems to be irrelevant in other 
countries. 
In the Philippines and Thailand, neither family CEO nor pyramid structure has any 
effect on firm performance. Interestingly, after controlling for country-specific effects, the   18
whole, eight-country pooled sample does not show any significant effect of family CEO or 
pyramid structure either, therefore supporting the “irrelevant” perspective.   
In Table 2, family ownership itself does not show significant effect on firm performance. 
In further exploratory analysis (Tables 3 and 4), we test if the control mechanisms of family 
CEO and pyramid structure moderate the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance. We interact each of the control mechanism variables, family CEO and pyramid 
structure, with family ownership separately. Generally supporting our previous findings in 
Table 2, Table 3 shows that family CEO positively moderates the effect of family ownership on 
firm performance in Indonesia and Taiwan, and negatively moderates the effect of family 
ownership on firm performance in Hong Kong. Table 4 illustrates that pyramid structure 
negatively moderates the effect of family ownership on firm performance in Indonesia and 
South Korea, whereas the moderating effect is positive in Malaysia. Relative to the results on 
the effects of having a pyramid structure in Table 2, the results for Indonesia (negative), South 
Korea (negative), and Malaysia (positive) are similar, whereas the positive sign for Hong Kong 
and Singapore in Table 2 becomes insignificant. 
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Table 3. 
Study 1: Moderating Effects of Family CEO on the Family Ownership-Performance Relationship a 
 
 
Hong 
Kong   Indonesia   Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore 
South  
Korea   Taiwan   Thailand 
Whole 
sample 
Family ownership  0.015*  -0.016*  0.003  0.010  0.000  0.004  -0.017**  -0.004  0.001 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) 
Ownership×CEO  -0.010* 0.017***  0.004 0.006  0.002  0.003 0.017***  -0.003 -0.000 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005) (.006)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Pyramid  0.316*  -0.298* 0.171* -0.067  0.127*  -0.174**  -0.083 -0.028 0.027 
  (0.176)  (0.167)  (0.098) (0.148)  (0.064)  (0.085) (0.105) (0.152) (0.046) 
Market cap (log)  -0.007  0.110  -0.04  0.056  0.070**  -0.133*  0.545*  -0.031  0.008 
  (0.043)  (0.066)  (0.047) (0.052)  (0.033)  (0.071) (0.281) (0.035) (0.020) 
Age -0.005  0.010  -0.003  0.010  0.001 -0.002  -0.003  -0.006**  -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.002) (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant  0.705  -0.509 0.757 -0.964  -1.288**  0.477 -10.453*  0.504 0.169 
  (0.810)  (0.926)  (0.659) (0.656)  (0.600)  (0.324) (5.662) -0.619  (0.280) 
N  151  95  125  47  71  131  60 64 744 
R
2  0.1343  0.2604  0.1773 0.3365  0.1983  0.1271 0.2994 0.2792 0.1992 
 
a. Numbers in parentheses are White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. Industry dummies are 
included in the models, and country dummies are included in the full sample model but are not reported due to space 
constraints.  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4. 
Study 1: Moderating Effects of Pyramid Structure on the Family Ownership-Performance 
Relationship a 
 
a. Numbers in parentheses are White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. Industry dummies are 
included in the models, and country dummies are included in the full sample model but are not reported due to space 
constraints.  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
Overall, the qualitative summary of our findings in Study 1 can be seen in Table 5. 
Given the support for both the “good” and “bad” hypotheses in different countries and the 
overall support for the “irrelevant” (default) perspective, at the very least, a “take-home” 
message is that sweeping statements, such as “Family ownership and control in large 
corporations are good” or “bad,” should be avoided.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hong 
Kong   Indonesia   Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore 
South 
Korea   Taiwan   Thailand 
Whole 
sample 
Family ownership  0.002  0.006  0.004  0.015*  0.000  0.009  0.003  -0.005  -0.000 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004) (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Ownership×Pyramid 0.01  -0.010* 0.008* -0.002 0.004 -0.012**  -0.004 -0.000  0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.002) 
Family CEO  -0.262*  0.381*  0.15  0.133  -0.062  0.045  0.328**  -0.058  -0.004 
  (0.156)  (0.194)  (0.135) (0.162)  (0.126)  (0.092) (0.132)  (0.089) (0.057) 
Market cap (log)  -0.016  0.120*  -0.044  0.062  0.068*  -0.133*  0.56  -0.03  -0.009 
  (0.046)  (0.064)  (0.046) (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.071) (0.268)  (0.034) (0.016) 
Age -0.005*  0.01  -0.004  0.01  0.001  -0.002 -0.002  -0.005**  -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.002) (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant 1.226  -1.131  0.74  -1.183*  -1.119*  0.453  -11.167**  0.512  0.511** 
  (0.932)  (0.855)  (0.622) (0.668)  (0.662)  (0.293) (5.334)  (0.585) (0.234) 
N 151  95  125  47  71  131  60  64  744 
R
2  0.1268  0.2592  0.1852 0.3313  0.191  0.1377 0.2983  0.2704 0.1957   21
Table 5.   
Study 1: Summary 
(A) Direct effects of family ownership and control mechanisms on firm performance 
 Good Bad  Irrelevant 
Family CEO  Indonesia,   
Taiwan 
Hong Kong  Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, Pooled sample 
Pyramid structure  Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore 
Indonesia, 
South Korea 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand,   
Pooled sample 
 
(B) Moderating effects of family ownership and control mechanisms on the family ownership-firm 
performance relationship 
 Positive  Negative  Irrelevant 
Family CEO x 
family ownership 
Indonesia,  
Taiwan 
Hong Kong  Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, Pooled sample 
Pyramid structure x 
family ownership 
Malaysia Indonesia, 
South Korea 
Hong Kong, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Pooled sample 
 
STUDY 2: INSTITUTIONS MATTER 
The findings of Study 1 raise two interesting but unanswered questions: Why are large 
family-owned and -controlled firms in certain Asian countries able to reap performance 
advantages while those in other countries are not? Why do the same control mechanisms assert 
opposite influence in different countries? To answer these questions, it seems imperative that 
we probe into the roots of institutions which underpin corporate governance and then 
investigate their impact on firm performance (Roe, 2002; Schneper and Guillen, 2004). These 
endeavors  lead  to  our  Study  2.       
 
Institutional Roots of Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms 
  Like their counterparts elsewhere, most stylized modern U.S. and U.K. corporations 
started with concentrated family ownership and control (Chandler, 1990). Over time, they 
evolve to separate ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932). An interesting puzzle is 
why this evolution is not observed in the rest of the world (Roe, 2002). While there are many   22
explanations, a leading explanation is an institutional one (La Porta et al., 1998). In brief, better 
formal legal protection of investor rights in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
especially the rights of minority shareholders, encourages founding families and their heirs to 
dilute their equity to attract minority shareholders and delegate day-to-day management to 
professional managers. Given reasonably effective investor protection, founding families 
themselves (such as the Rockefellers) may over time feel comfortable becoming minority 
shareholders of the firms they founded. On the other hand, when formal legal and regulatory 
institutions are dysfunctional, founding families must run their firms directly. In the absence of 
effective investor protection, bestowing management rights to nonfamily, professional 
managers may invite abuse and theft – in other words, rampant agency problems. By default, 
founding families as controlling shareholders are not willing to hire outside managers – unless 
they allow these managers to marry into the family (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). In 
addition, prospective minority shareholder may be less willing to invest without sufficient 
protection, thus forcing concentrated ownership to become the default mode.
10 Overall,  there  is 
evidence that the weaker the formal legal and regulatory institutions protecting shareholders, 
the more concentrated ownership and control rights become (La Porta et al., 1998; Young et al., 
2002).  
In the United States, Anderson and Reeb (2003) recently refute the Fama and Jensen 
(1983) proposition that “Family ownership and control are bad for large firms,” which is 
consistent with our H2 and H4 in Study 1. However, Anderson and Reeb (2003) are careful in 
noting that their results may be contingent upon the particular institutional frameworks 
governing large family firms in the United States. Anderson and Reeb (2003: 1324) specifically 
suggest that their findings may only hold in “well-regulated and transparent markets” and that 
in Asia, their results may not hold. While this interpretation is consistent with the generally 
understood, coarse-grained differences in institutional frameworks between the United States 
                                                        
10  “What’s the best way to avoid losing out as a minority shareholder in Asia?” two prominent 
consultants answer in an influential book on Asian business, Big in Asia, “Don’t be one” (Backman and 
Butler, 2003: 235).       23
and Asia, our findings in Study 1 suggest that even within Asia, some “good” results may be 
found in certain countries. Therefore, it is interesting to engage in a finer-grained exploration 
within  Asia,  as  discussed  next.     
How Institutions Matter   
For large family-owned and -controlled firms, according to La Porta et al. (2002: 1148), 
“the central agency problem is not the failure of the Berle and Means (1932) professional 
managers to serve dispersed shareholders, but rather the – often legal – expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.” These conflicts are labeled as 
“principal-principal” conflicts – as opposed to principal-agent conflicts – by Young et al. 
(2002). Given the simultaneous existence of the benefits and costs of having a family CEO and 
a pyramid structure (see Study 1), the crucial issue boils down to under what conditions the 
“good” outweigh the “bad” – and vice versa (Villalonga and Amit, 2005). While individual 
families may vary in their propensity to expropriate minority shareholders (e.g., some may be 
more “greedy” than others), recent research finds that cross-country differences in the scale and 
scope of expropriation systematically vary according to the differences in minority shareholder 
protection afforded by legal and regulatory institutions (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; La Porta et 
al., 2002). Consequently, Figure 1 divides countries in two groups: those with more developed 
legal and regulatory institutions protecting shareholders and those with less developed 
institutions. When plotted together with the two family ownership and control mechanisms used 
in Study 1, Figure 1 generates a 2 x 2 matrix with four cells. Each leads to a hypothesis for 
Study  2.     24
Figure 1. Study 2: How Institutions Matter 
 Countries  with  less developed 
legal and regulatory institutions to 
protect shareholders 
(Indonesia, Philippines, South 
Korea, and Thailand)   
Countries with more developed 
legal and regulatory institutions to 
protect shareholders 
(Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Taiwan) 
 
Family CEO 
 
 
Cell 1: Good (H5) 
 
Cell 2: Bad (H6) 
 
Pyramid structure 
 
 
Cell 3: Bad (H7) 
 
Cell 4: Good (H8) 
 
In countries with less developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect investors 
(Cell 1), having a family CEO may be beneficial. This is because in the absence of effective 
investor protection, outside, nonfamily managers may significantly deviate from pursuing the 
interests of both controlling and minority shareholders. Under these circumstances, despite the 
potential drawbacks associated with having a family CEO (such as those noted in Study 1), 
having a family CEO, on balance, may still add value. Conversely, in countries with more 
developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect investors (Cell 2), outside, nonfamily 
managers may be more effectively monitored and disciplined. Under these circumstances, 
having a family CEO in order to combat agency problems brought by nonfamily managers may 
be redundant and even counter-productive.     
This line of reasoning is supported by one of the most striking findings from our Study 
1: Having a family CEO is good for firm performance in Indonesia and bad in Hong Kong. In 
the absence of concrete information that controlling families in Hong Kong are systematically 
more “greedy” than those in Indonesia, it seems plausible to suggest that the different levels of 
investor protection in their institutional frameworks may play a role. Table 1 shows that while 
91% of the Indonesian firms appoint a family CEO, only two thirds of the Hong Kong firms do 
that. It seems that controlling families in Indonesia are a lot more reluctant to appoint outsiders 
as CEOs. Exploring the generalizability of such Study 1 findings, Study 2 tests the following   25
two  hypotheses:       
Hypothesis 5: The presence of a family CEO is positively related with firm performance in 
countries with less developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect shareholders. 
Hypothesis 6: The presence of a family CEO is negatively related with firm performance in 
countries with more developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect shareholders. 
Cell 3 in Figure 1 portrays countries with less developed legal and regulatory 
institutions to protect investors. Under these circumstances, having a pyramid structure, often 
set up by the controlling family, may increase the amount of expropriation of minority 
shareholders. This problem may become especially severe, as the number of “tiers” of the 
pyramid increases and controlling shareholders have lower cash-flow ownership levels (Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 2002). Further, in such countries with underdeveloped 
investor protection institutions, controlling families usually have a relatively “free hand” in 
expropriating minority shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2002; Chang, 2003). Conversely, in Cell 4 
which depicts countries with better investor protection, although controlling families, who set 
up pyramids, may have the same incentive to expropriate minority shareholders, their ability to 
do so may be constrained by the legal and regulatory frameworks.       
We are not arguing that all controlling families will expropriate minority shareholders. 
Indeed, some controlling shareholders may develop a reputation for treating minority 
shareholders fairly (Gomes, 2000). Since institutions governing corporate behavior consist of 
three “pillars” (a formal regulatory pillar and two informal normative and cognitive pillars) 
(Scott, 1995), what we are arguing is that reputation, based on informal norms and cognitions, 
may be a poor substitute for formal legal protection of minority shareholder rights. For 
example, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when controlling families themselves suffered 
huge losses, even some of the most reputable controlling families expropriated minority 
shareholders in order to “make up” the losses (Johnson et al., 2000). This suggests the 
vulnerability of relying on informal normative and cognitive institutions such as reputation to 
police individual, family, and corporate behavior in the absence of formal institutions.         26
Again, Study 1 findings on the contrast between Indonesia and Hong Kong are 
indicative of some of these dynamics. While controlling shareholders in Hong Kong are also 
known to expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001), the 
scale and scope of such expropriation in Indonesia are in a different league (Johnson et al., 
2000). In fact, a pyramid structure in Hong Kong is found in Study 1 to be generally beneficial, 
despite its drawbacks. Therefore:        
Hypothesis 7: The presence of a pyramid structure is negatively related with firm 
performance in countries with less developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect 
shareholders. 
Hypothesis 8: The presence of a pyramid structure is positively related with firm performance 
in countries with more developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect shareholders. 
  Overall, building on the findings of Study 1, Study 2 directly links the “good” and 
“bad” sides of family ownership and control with one country’s institutional frameworks 
governing corporate governance. It aims to shed light on how  institutions  matter.    
STUDY 2: METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Variables 
    Study 2 continues to draw on the same data sources reported in Study 1. We have 
collected significant additional data to better account for firm characteristics and institutional 
frameworks. However, the quest for additional data reduces our sample size from 744 to 688 
publicly listed, family-owned and -controlled firms in the same eight Asian countries in Study 1. 
We continue to focus on firm value, measured as the cumulative stock return in 1996. To 
control for other factors that might affect stock return, we use an additional set of control 
variables – in addition to firm size, age, and industry used in Study 1. Firm leverage (measured 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets) and market-to-book ratio (measured as the market value 
of equity divided by the book value of equity) are obtained from Worldscope. Stock risk (beta) 
is computed by regressing a firm’s monthly stock return on the corresponding country index 
return in 1996 from Datastream. Because market value in the previous year may also affect   27
stock return in the current year, we control for firm stock price at the beginning of 1996 in U.S. 
dollars using the prevailing exchange rate.   
We measure institutional variables based on La Porta et al. (1998), whose index has 
been widely used and validated in recent cross-country studies (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Johnson et al., 2000; Schneper and Guillen, 2004). Table 6 represents country scores in the 
index for (1) efficiency of judicial system, (2) rule of law, and (3) corruption, which are three 
broad institutional measures crucial for the protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Judicial efficiency is the assessment by Business International Corporation of “the efficiency 
and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business” (La Porta et al., 1998: 1124). Rule 
of law and corruption are assessments by International Country Risk Services. Rule of law is 
the law and order tradition the country. Corruption is the extent of corruption in the government 
– particularly the extent to which businesses have to pay bribes (La Porta et al., 1998). All of 
these measures are calculated well before the 1997 Asian crisis. Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, with each score higher than the average, are considered as countries 
with more developed legal and regulatory institutions. Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, and 
Thailand, with each score lower than the average, are considered as countries with less 
developed legal and regulatory institutions. A total of 302 and 386 firms are found in countries 
with less and more developed institutions, respectively.   
Table 6. 
Study 2: Rankings of Legal and Regulatory Institutions   
 
Efficiency  
of judicial 
system 
 
Rule  
of law 
 
 
Corruption 
 
 
Countries with more  developed  institutions       
    Hong  Kong  10  8.22  8.52 
    Malaysia  9  6.78  7.38 
    Singapore  10  8.57  8.22 
    Taiwan  6.75  8.52  6.85 
     
Average  6.5 6.3 5.8 
       28
Countries with less developed  institutions     
    Indonesia  2.5  3.98  2.15 
    Philippines  4.75  2.73  2.92 
    South  Korea  6  5.35  5.3 
    Thailand  3.25  6.25  5.18 
 
Source: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1998. Law and finance (pp. 1142-1143). 
Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113-1155. 
 
Table 7 reports mean values of variables of these two groups of firms. The average stock 
return in countries with less developed institutions is significantly lower than that in countries 
with more developed institutions. Family ownership averages 24% across the sample. There are 
no significant differences in family ownership, family CEO, pyramid structure, firm age, and 
stock risk beta across the sample. Firms in countries with less developed legal and regulatory 
institutions have significantly lower market capitalization, firm value, and market-to-book ratio 
as well as higher debt-to-asset ratio.       
Table 7. 
Study 2: Similarities and Differences Between Firms in Countries   
with Less and More Developed Institutions for Shareholder Protection 
 
Firms in 
countries 
with less 
developed 
institutions 
Firms in 
countries 
with more 
developed 
institutions Difference 
  (N=302) (N=386)   
Stock return    2.84%  36.84%  -0.34*** 
Family ownership (% of total share outstanding)  24.189  24.163  0.03
ns 
Family CEO (1 = having a family CEO)  0.798  0.8316  -0.03
ns 
Pyramid structure (1 = having a pyramid structure)  0.447  0.4793  -0.03
ns 
Market capitalization (log)  11.939  12.564  -0.62*** 
Firm age  28.626  29.497  -0.87
ns 
Debt-to-asset ratio  37.711  21.904  15.8** 
Firm value (start of 1996) (US$)  7.4402  157.54  -150*** 
Stock risk beta  0.9748  0.916  0.06
ns 
Market-to-book ratio  1.413  2.2082  -0.8*** 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Econometric Issues 
In Study 2, we estimate the following model again using the OLS method: Stock return 
= α + β1 (family ownership) + β2 (family CEO) + β3 (pyramid structure) + β4 (logarithm of 
market capitalization) + β5 (age) + β6 (debt to asset ratio) + β7 (starting stock price) + β8 (stock 
risk beta) + β9 (market to book value) + ε (including industry dummies). Firms in more 
developed legal and regulatory institutions are fit into the model first, then firms in less 
developed legal and regulatory institutions, and lastly, pooled data. Multicollinearity does not 
appear to be a significant problem, because the average variance inflation factors for all the 
models are less than 10. Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust (Huber-White-Sandwich) 
standard errors. 
STUDY 2: FINDINGS 
      Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics used in Study 2. Table 9 documents the 
regression results with three models. Model 1 (302 firms) focuses on countries with less 
developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect shareholders, Model 2 (386 firms) deals 
with countries with more developed institutions, and Model 3 (688 firms) pools data from all 
the countries. 
Table 8. 
  Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Firms in countries with less developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect shareholders (N = 302) 
Variables 
Mea
n S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
1.  Stock  return  0.03  0.75            
2. Family ownership 
24.1
9 
12.6
8 
-0.0
3            
3.  Family  CEO  0.80  0.40  0.09  0.08          
4. Pyramid structure  0.45  0.50  0.11 
-0.2
2  0.12         
5. Market capitalization (log) 
11.9
4 1.53 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06           
6. Firm age 
28.6
3 
16.8
9 
-0.0
1 
-0.1
9 
-0.1
0 0.02 0.06           30
7. Debt-to-asset ratio 
37.7
1 
24.2
2 
-0.1
2 
-0.0
5 0.03 
-0.0
7 
-0.1
6 0.07       
8. Firm value (start of 1996)  7.44 
25.4
5 
-0.1
2 0.27 0.02 
-0.1
4 0.21 
-0.0
5 
-0.1
2    
9. Stock risk beta  0.98  0.92 
-0.0
3 
-0.0
3 0.07 
-0.0
6 0.15 
-0.0
4 0.11 
0.0
1  
10.  Market-to-book  ratio  1.41 1.33 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.47 
-0.0
4 
-0.1
9 
0.0
8 
-0.0
1 
              
Firms in countries with more developed legal and regulatory institutions to protect shareholders (N = 386) 
Variables 
Mea
n S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
1.  Stock  return  0.37  0.57            
2. Family ownership 
24.1
6 
11.4
2  0.03           
3. Family CEO  0.83  0.38 
-0.1
5  0.05          
4. Pyramid structure  0.48  0.5 
-0.0
2 
-0.4
5  0.16         
5. Market capitalization (log) 
12.5
6 1.40 0.17 
-0.1
6 
-0.2
1 
-0.0
0        
6. Firm age  29.5 
18.5
8 
-0.0
7 0.14 
-0.0
3 
-0.0
2 0.23         
7. Debt-to-asset ratio  21.9 
15.3
9 
-0.0
0 
-0.0
7 0.07 0.11 -0.1 
-0.1
3      
8. Firm value (start of 1996) 
157.
5 
342.
1 
-0.0
5 
-0.0
8 
-0.1
1 0.04 0.46 0.15 
-0.1
0    
9. Stock risk beta  0.92  0.93  0.26  0.01 
-0.0
2 
-0.0
2 0.21 0.06 
-0.0
1 
0.0
5  
10. Market-to-book ratio  2.21  2.27  0.08 
-0.0
3 0.02 0.03 0.06 
-0.0
4 
-0.0
1 
0.1
2 0.09 
              
Whole sample (N = 688)             
Variables 
Mea
n S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
1.  Stock  return  0.22  0.67            
2. Family ownership 
24.1
7 
11.9
8 
-0.0
0            
3. Family CEO  0.82  0.39 
-0.0
2  0.06          
4.  Pyramid  structure  0.47  0.50  0.05  -0.3 0.14           31
4 
5. Market capitalization (log) 
12.2
9 1.49 0.15 
-0.0
5 
-0.0
9  0.03        
6. Firm age 
29.1
1 
17.8
5 
-0.0
4 
-0.0
0 
-0.0
6 
-0.0
1 0.15         
7. Debt-to-asset ratio 
28.8
4 
21.2
4 
-0.1
6 
-0.0
5 0.03 
-0.0
0 
-0.2
0 
-0.0
3      
8. Firm value (start of 1996) 
91.6
5 
267.
2 0.04 
-0.0
4 
-0.0
7 0.03 0.38 0.12 
-0.1
6    
9. Stock risk beta  0.94  0.92  0.10 
-0.0
1 0.02 
-0.0
4 0.18 0.01 0.06 
0.0
2  
10.  Market-to-book  ratio  1.86 1.95 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.22 
-0.0
3 
-0.1
4 
0.1
6 0.05 
 
Table 9. 
Study 2: Direct Effects of Family Ownership and Control Mechanisms on Firm Performance 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Less developed 
countries 
More developed 
countries 
Whole  
Sample 
Family ownership  -0.0022  0.0042*  -0.0002 
 (0.0027)  (0.0023)  (0.0018) 
Family CEO  0.1167*  -0.0715  0.0013 
 (0.0691)  (0.0969)  (0.0603) 
Pyramid  -0.1396** 0.1436**  0.0129 
 (0.0685)  (0.0679)  (0.0476) 
Market cap (log)  -0.056  0.0863**  0.025 
 (0.0385)  (0.0268)  (0.0173) 
Age 0.0028  -0.004**  -0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.0016)  (0.0015) 
Debt-to-asset ratio  -0.0015  0.0004  -0.0009 
 (0.002)  (0.0019)  (0.0014) 
Firm value (beginning of 1996)  -0.0011*  -0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Stock risk beta  0.0169  0.1022**  0.0663* 
 (0.0504)  (0.041)  (0.0352) 
Market-to-book ratio  0.1673*  0.0239  0.0493* 
 (0.0964)  (0.0164)  (0.0275) 
Constant 0.0530  -1.3150***  0.4142*** 
 (0.3797)  (0.4142)  (0.2466) 
N 302  386  688   32
F 4.6  8.04  12.68 
R2  0.2402 0.253  0.2335 
 
Numbers in parentheses are White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. Industry dummies and 
country dummies are included in the models but are not reported due to space constraints.   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
  Model 1 supports both Hypotheses 5 and 7. Specifically, in less developed countries, 
having a family CEO is value-enhancing (12% higher than having a nonfamily CEO), while 
having a pyramid structure is value-destroying (14% lower than nonpyramid firms). Both 
findings are significant. Model 2 supports Hypothesis 8 in that having a pyramid structure is 
beneficial for stock return (14% higher than nonpyramid firms) in more developed countries. 
However, Hypothesis 6 is not supported: Although the coefficient sign is in the predicted 
direction (negative), it does not reach significance. Finally, Model 3 on the whole, eight-country, 
pooled sample – like Study 1 – does not show any significant impact of family CEO or pyramid 
structure on firm performance. Therefore, this finding,    again, supports the “irrelevant” 
perspective. Overall, Study 2 is strongly supportive of the view that whether family ownership 
and control in large firms are good, bad, or irrelevant is systematically correlated with the legal 
and regulatory institutions governing  shareholder  protection.    
DISCUSSION 
Contributions 
    Overall, three sets of theoretical and empirical contributions emerge. First, theoretically, 
to the best of our knowledge, ours are among the first studies which address all sides of the 
debate head-on. Although the agency theory-based Fama and Jensen (1983) prediction that 
large family firms which do not separate ownership and control will suffer from inefficiency is 
supported by Study 1 in some countries in Asia, it is refuted in other countries and refuted in the 
aggregate, pooled sample. Overall, just like the Berle and Means (1932) hypothesis on the 
inevitable separation of ownership and control at large firms turns out to be supported only in 
certain parts of the world (La Porta et al., 1999), the Fama and Jensen (1983) prediction has 
only  received  partial  support  in  Study  1.          33
        A second theoretical contribution lies in the identification that the benefits and costs of 
family ownership and control vary systematically according to the level of legal and regulatory 
protection for shareholders. More specifically, our Study 2 joins the recent work of La Porta et 
al. (1998, 1999, 2002), Roe (2002), Schneper and Guillen (2004), Young et al. (2002), and 
others in sketching the contours of a cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate 
governance. This theory enriches the debate, by suggesting that findings from numerous 
single-country studies need to be qualified with an explicit discussion on the enabling and 
constraining forces of the institutional frameworks. For example, this theory can help reconcile 
Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) “good” findings in the United States and Chang’s (2003) “bad” 
findings in South Korea. It is neither controlling families are uniformly “good” or “bad,” nor 
are American families less “greedy” than Korean families. Rather, it is the different institutional 
frameworks American and Korean families have to face that make a difference. In large U.S. 
firms, controlling families’ tendency to expropriate minority shareholders can be potentially 
constrained by independent directors whose power is supported by the legal and regulatory 
frameworks (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), whereas in large Korean firms, this might be difficult. 
Overall, our studies show that national institutions can be conceptualized in a way that captures 
variations across countries, which then can be used to explain differences in an outcome 
variable of interest.   
Empirically, perhaps the strongest message out of Study 1 is that given the simultaneous 
findings of the “good,” “bad,” and “irrelevant” within Asia, efforts to generate models of 
“Asian corporate governance” or “Asian family firm” may be counterproductive. Another 
empirical contribution, out of both Studies 1 and 2, lies in the discovery of the opposite effect of 
the two main mechanisms for family ownership and control — family CEO and pyramid 
structure. This contrast is especially noteworthy between Hong Kong (a highly developed 
common law practitioner which was a British colony until 1997) and Indonesia (an 
underdeveloped civil law country which was a Dutch colony until 1945).
11  Finally, Study 2 
                                                        
11  However, this contrast is not as strong in some “mid-range” countries, such as Thailand. Although La 
Porta et al. (1998: 1130) classify Thailand as a common law country, the CIA World Factbook (2005)   34
empirically answers why such opposite findings are found. Specifically, countries with better 
developed legal and regulatory institutions enable more of the benefits of family ownership and 
control to outshine their drawbacks. In contrast, families in countries with less developed 
institutions may have more opportunities to engage in expropriation.     
In summary, this article contributes to the literature by theoretically arguing that the net 
balance of the benefits and costs of family ownership and control in large firms – good, bad, or 
insignificant – is systematically linked with the legal and regulatory institutions governing 
investor protection, and empirically documenting this case through a large sample of firms 
throughout  Asia.    
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The limitations of our two studies suggest a number of avenues for future research. First, 
while it seems helpful to build a cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate governance, 
we have barely scratched the surface of institutions affecting corporate governance.
12 Although 
our focus on the formal legal and regulatory institutions is a useful first step, it is important to 
note that institutions also include numerous other formal and informal aspects such as 
competition policies and cultural and societal norms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Scott, 1995). 
In emerging economies, the formal laws on books may look increasingly like those found in the 
West, but the actual implementation, driven more significantly by informal norms and 
cognitions, may remain ineffective (Wright et al., 2005). These dynamics thus necessitate our 
expansion to capture some of these complexities in future work. 
A second limitation is that we may have painted a coarse-grained picture of “family 
firms,” by not differentiating various types of families. Intuitively, it seems plausible that firms 
owned and controlled by the first generation (parents) may exhibit more altruism among family 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
suggests that Thailand has a civil law system, “with influences of common law.” Thus, it is not 
surprising that the findings out of Thailand are not as strong in either direction as those out of Hong 
Kong or Indonesia. 
12  While the institutional origins variables advocated by La Porta et al. (1998) have been influential, 
there is some debate regarding their validity. For example, Rajan and Zingales (2003: 14) find the La 
Porta et al. (1998) measures to be only accurate in the post-World War II era. 
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members, and that firms owned and controlled by the second or third generations (sibling 
partnerships) may have more dysfunctional squabbles (Schulze et al., 2003). In the United 
States, Anderson and Reeb (2003: 1303) document that it is firms with founder CEOs that 
outperform those with professional CEOs, and that second or third generation family CEOs 
have no effect on market performance. Also in the United States, Villalonga and Amit (2005) 
find that second- and third-generation family CEOs destroy value. However, our efforts to 
control for the different generations in our data have been frustrated by our inability to 
unambiguously identify these different generations in eight countries with such a large sample. 
Systematic exploration of this effect has to wait for further research.           
A third limitation is our cross-sectional design. Although we have built one of the most 
comprehensive databases on large Asian firms, given the diversity of these countries and the 
opposite results we find, it may be useful to longitudinally track the changing role of families 
over time. It is possible that as legal and regulatory institutions become better developed, the 
benefits of having a family CEO may decrease, and the risks associated with a pyramid 
structure may decrease.     
  Finally, it is important to acknowledge that our exploratory efforts have only reported 
correlations, which are not causations. While our hypotheses are carefully phrased in the 
language of correlations (“A is related with B,” not “A causes B”), it will be important to push 
this research further. One design may be to conduct event studies by investigating the impact of 
changes in family ownership and control on abnormal stock returns in future research.   
CONCLUSION 
    Despite the Berle and Means (1932) hypothesis, most large firms outside the 
Anglo-American world have “stubbornly” continued to concentrate ownership and control in 
the hands of families. In the eight Asian countries that we study, while some of these large firms 
indeed suffer from poor performance, many others seem to benefit from concentrated family 
ownership and control, and still others manage to have their performance unaffected by these 
ownership and control issues. Overall, there is no concrete evidence documenting that   36
controlling families in large firms are always “paragons,” “parasites,” or “irrelevant” – our 
Study 1 suggests that they are “all of the above.” Addressing why this is the case, our Study 2 
theorizes and documents that whether controlling families in large firms are “paragons” or 
“parasites” systematically depends on the differences in the legal and regulatory institutions 
which protect shareholders in various countries.       
    From a policy standpoint, our findings have important implications for corporate 
governance reforms in Asia (and perhaps elsewhere). Calls for reforms in the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis made by Western advisors and media as well as international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to reduce family 
ownership concentration, introduce more outside shareholders, professionalize management, 
and break pyramid structures need to be embraced with caution.
13  In less developed countries 
(such as Indonesia), having a family CEO may provide a better internal control mechanism and 
better access to resources. However, in Indonesia, having a pyramid structure may afford 
controlling families more opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders. In more 
developed and less corrupt countries (such as Hong Kong), the benefits of having a family CEO 
may be outweighed by the potential costs, whereas the opportunities for family firms using a 
pyramid structure to expropriate minority shareholders may be limited. In conclusion, reforms 
may be needed, but actions need to be substantiated by an in-depth understanding of the 
complex dynamics associated with family ownership  and  control  in  large  firms.         
                                                        
13  This is similar to the caution we need to embrace when dealing with other theoretically and 
intuitively sensible but empirically ambiguous suggestions in reforming corporate governance in 
emerging economies, such as appointing outside directors to corporate boards (Peng, 2004).       37
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